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International fragmentation means that firms do not carry out entire production processes 
in the home country, but locate certain stages in foreign countries which offer lower cost 
conditions. Such outsourcing of value-added is often perceived as a threat to domestic 
employment and wages.  
Outsourcing has two direct effects. First, it implies cost-savings to domestic firms. 
Ceteris paribus, this should allow them to pay higher factor rewards, and under conditions 
of perfect competition the cost-savings will indeed be passed on to some factor(s). 
Secondly, the industry’s domestic factor demand is altered. If a very labour-intensive stage 
is moved abroad, domestic production will become more capital-intensive. It is unclear, a 
priori, whether the outcome of these two effects is higher wages or higher returns to other 
factors, possibly even at the expense of labour. It depends on how “outsourcing-industries” 
are related to other sectors of the domestic economy. The wage-effect of international 
fragmentation can only be determined by a full general equilibrium analysis. 
Economists often use factor price frontiers to explore how factor prices are 
determined in general equilibrium. Such frontiers depict alternative combinations of factor 
prices that an economy can “afford”, given its technology and output prices. They are 
usually constructed assuming that there is no international fragmentation of production, or 
that the margin of fragmentation remains constant. However, if outsourcing is determined 
by foreign cost-advantages for certain stages or production, then alternative domestic 
factor price combinations must imply different degrees of outsourcing. Hence, the notion 
of a factor price frontier for a given margin of fragmentation is questionable. 
This paper develops a generalized factor price frontier which incorporates an 
endogenous adjustment of fragmentation when moving from one point on the frontier to 
another. It assumes two factors (capital and labour) and a foreign economy where labour is 
relatively cheap. Moreover, it assumes that foreign factor prices as well as final output 
prices, determined on world markets, are unaffected by domestic outsourcing as such. 
Using the generalized frontier, it is shown that outsourcing may be a “friend” or 
“enemy” to domestic labour, depending on how the aggregate and marginal capital 
intensity, respectively, of the “outsourcing-industry” compare to the rest of the economy. 
Aggregate intensity refers to the overall domestic part of production. Marginal intensity 
refers to the single stage where firms are indifferent between domestic and foreign 
production. The same comparison also determines whether a multistage industry responds 
to a rise in the final goods price by broadening the range of stages produced domestically, 
or by specializing on an ever narrower range of stages. Endogenous fragmentation 
generally makes capital and labour closer substitutes. The real income redistribution 
attendant upon a change in the final goods price (Stolper-Samuelson theorem) is 
aggravated by endogenous fragmentation if that price increases, while it is mitigated for a 
price cut. The generalized frontier is a convenient tool to describe the technology of 
outsourcing. It shows that the factor price effect of “easier” fragmentation similarly 
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Abstract
I develop a generalized factor price frontier which incorporates endogenous adjustment
of international fragmentation in multistage production, allowing for a continuum of
stages. This allows us to address fragmentation, not only as an exogenous event, but
also as an integral part of endogenous adjustment to a variety of changes not directly
related to fragmentation. A two-dimensional general equilibrium analysis explores how
the margin of fragmentation, as well as factor prices, respond to a change in the ﬁnal
output price, and to an improvement in the “technology of fragmentation”. A key
distinction arises between the “average” and “marginal” labour intensity, respectively,
of domestic production in the multistage industry. The paper identiﬁes conditions un-
der which outsourcing to a low-wage country is a “friend” or an “enemy” to domestic
labour, as well as conditions under which the Jonesian magniﬁcation eﬀects underlying
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem are reinforced, or mitigated, by endogenous changes
in the margin of fragmentation. Protection may result in a broader or a narrower
range of stages produced domestically.
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Warwick, special session on “Fragmentation of Production and International Trade”. I am grateful
to the Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalization and Economic Policy (GEP), University of
Nottingham for covering the expenses my conference trip. Thanks are due to Gabriel Felbermayr for
very helpful comments on an earlier version.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The 1990s have witnessed a new form of economic globalization, often called fragmentation
or outsourcing, whereby ﬁrms no longer carry out all stages of production in their home
country, but locate some stages in foreign countries where economic conditions are more
advantageous. The phenomenon has drawn considerable attention in connection with the
widespread concern about wage inequality. There is now a sizable body of literature docu-
menting the empirical importance of international fragmentation, which has, in turn, spurred
considerable theoretical research on its causes and eﬀects, particularly its eﬀects on factor
prices and income distribution.1.
Despite signiﬁcant progress, the current state of theoretical analysis of international frag-
mentation has certain shortcomings. It is prone to a casuistic approach, leading to a variety
of diﬀerent results that sometimes seem contradictory and diﬃcult to reconcile. In Kohler
(2003), I have made an attempt to identify general principles behind seemingly contradictory
results. A further shortcoming is that the analysis often lacks an explicit modeling of the
multistage nature of production which, by necessity, underlies international fragmentation.
In this paper, I propose a modeling framework, where the multistage nature of industrial
production is made explicit, and where the engineering sequence of stages is juxtaposed with
economic incentives for international fragmentation. The model draws on Dixit & Grossman
(1982) in assuming that there is a continuum of fragments which makes the margin of out-
sourcing (or fragmentation) a continuous variable. This should, in turn, facilitate an easier
use of tools commonly relied upon in general equilibrium trade theory. More speciﬁcally,
when economists explore determinants of factor prices in general equilibrium they often use
factor price frontiers. While there are treatments of outsourcing assuming a continuum of
stages [e.g., Feenstra & Hanson (1996, 1997)], these do not develop the underlying price
frontier.
The factor price frontier is a representation of alternative factor price combinations that
are supported, in a competitive equilibrium, by an economy’s technology and by given prices
for ﬁnal outputs. In the empirical literature, such frontiers have been used, in more or less ex-
plicit ways, to justify so-called “mandated wage regressions” [see for instance Leamer (1998),
and Feenstra & Hanson (1999)]. In theoretical models of fragmentation, however, they have
1Throughout this paper, outsourcing and fragmentation are used synonymously, and we always refer to
international outsourcing. For empirical literature see, for instance, Irwin (1996), Feenstra (1998), Hummels,
Rapoport, Ishii and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii & Yi (2001), and several papers in Arndt & Kierzkowski (2001).
On the driving force of technological advances in communication and transport, see Jones & Kierzkowski
(1990), Harris (1995 and 2001), and Jones & Kierzkowski (2001a). For theoretical treatments, see Feenstra &
Hanson (1996 and 1997), Arndt (1997 and 1999), Venables (1999), Jones (2000), Deardorﬀ (2001a and 2001b),
Jones & Kierzkowski (2001a and 2001b), and Helpman & Grossman (2002).
1so far not been used extensively. There is a general argument to the eﬀect that international
outsourcing acts like a technological change which eﬀectively shifts the domestic economy’s
factor price frontier [Feenstra & Hanson (1999)]. This essentially assumes that outsourcing is
an exogenous event. But under very general conditions outsourcing is importantly inﬂuenced
by domestic factor prices. Hence, it should be seen as an endogenous phenomenon which is
driven by factor price changes traced out by the factor price frontier. In terms of the wage
regressions in the empirical literature, this implies that including an outsourcing regressor-
variable poses a simultaneity problem. If we have a model of how domestic factor prices
changes aﬀect outsourcing, and how outsourcing in turn aﬀects the competitive equilibrium,
then it should be possible to develop what may be called an “endogenous fragmentation fac-
tor price frontier”, i.e., a generalized factor price frontier which represents alternative factor
price combinations supported by the speciﬁc conditions or outsourcing, in addition to the
fundamental technological knowledge and ﬁnal output prices.
Such a generalized factor price frontier opens up a more general view on international
fragmentation than is usually taken in the literature. First, it is a very convenient dual
representation of what may be called the “technology” of fragmentation, which allows us to
address a variety of factors that may be responsible for the increasing empirical importance
of international outsourcing, and which should serve as a useful basis for empirical modeling.
As an example, I shall demonstrate how the generalized factor price frontier may be used
to explore speciﬁc improvements in the “technology” of international fragmentation. And
secondly, such a frontier allows us to consider outsourcing as an integral (endogenous) part
of adjustment to certain shocks not directly related to outsourcing, but where adjustment
under endogenous fragmentation may be diﬀerent in important respects from adjustment
under exogenous fragmentation, or adjustment without fragmentation. As an example, I
shall consider the protective eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁnal output price of a multistage
industry, whether policy induced or otherwise.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I ﬁrst develop a dual representation
of technology for a single sector featuring multistage production under fragmentation. In
doing so, I rely on the notion of a continuum of stages, as in Dixit & Grossman (1982),
assuming two factors (capital and labour) with given prices abroad. Section 3 derives a
generalized factor price frontier which incorporates an endogenous adjustment of the margin
of international fragmentation to domestic factor price changes, and it explores the properties
of this frontier. Section 4 moves to a general equilibrium perspective by adding a single-
stage sector and a domestic endowment constraint. Section 5 presents a comparative static
analysis of protection for the multistage industry in the form of a higher ﬁnal output price.
Does the sector respond by an increased level of outsourcing, and if so, does this beneﬁto r
harm domestic labour? Does an endogenous adjustment of international fragmentation to
changes in the ﬁnal output price entail a reinforcement, or a mitigation, of the magniﬁcation
2eﬀects underlying the Stolper-Samuelson theorem? Does higher protection imply that a
broader or narrower range of stages is produced domestically? Section 6 shows how the dual
representation of multistage production with outsourcing may be used to explore possible
improvements in the “technology” of fragmentation. I address a very simple scenario of such
an improvement, focusing on the eﬀects on real factor rewards. Section 7 concludes the paper
b yw a yo fab r i e fs u m m a r y .
2 Multistage production and fragmentation
Industrial processes are often characterized by a well-deﬁned engineering sequence of stages,
whereby at stage i primary factors combine in a speciﬁc way in order to add to the value
g e n e r a t e db ys t a g e su pt oi,u n t i la ts o m eﬁnal stage the ﬁnal good becomes available. We
assume that sector 1 is featured by such multistage production, while sector 2 involves a
single stage according to a linearly homogeneous technology, using capital and labour which
are perfectly mobile across sectors. Suppose that c2(w,r) is the minimum unit-cost function
for sector 2, where w and r denote the wage rate and capital rental, respectively, expressed in
units of the numéraire good 2.F o rs e c t o r1, f(w,r,i) denotes the minimum cost associated
with a unit of stage-i production, and a unit of the ﬁnal good requires a(i) units of stage-i
production. Assuming linear homogeneity of production at all stages, f(w,r,i) is independent
on the level at which stage-i is operated.2 Following Dixit & Grossman (1982), I assume that
i is a continuous variable in the closed interval [0,1]. Without loss of generality, we assume
that as i moves from 0 to 1, production moves “downstream”, so that the ﬁnal good becomes
available as i =1 . This the aforementioned engineering sequence of stages.
We assume that the economy is integrated in world commodity markets, but for some
reason factor prices are not equalized internationally. Firms in sector 1 may exploit inter-
national factor price diﬀerences by outsourcing some stages to foreign factor markets where
factor prices are ¯ w and ¯ r, in which case production becomes fragmented.
We can now envisage an economic sequence of stages by identifying the cost-advantage
of outsourcing. There are two diﬀerent forces at work here. One is the cost of international
fragmentation, the other is the factor price diﬀerence. For simplicity, we assume that the cost
of extra transport and communication is of the familiar iceberg-type. I.e., τ(i) > 1 units of
foreign stage-i production need to be carried out for 1 unit of this stage to become available
domestically towards further processing in subsequent stages of production. This is a crude
but convenient way to introduce the “distance” factor into the analysis of international frag-
2Strictly speaking, stage i of production should be denoted by i+di, and its unit cost by f(w,r,i)di.F o r
ease of notation and wording, stage i+di will henceforth simply be called stage i.
3mentation.3 In addition, there may be Ricardian eﬃciency gaps between the two economies.
If one unit of domestic labour is required to secure a certain amount of stage-i output, se-
curing that same amount via outsourcing requires ρ(i) > 0 units of foreign labour. And the
same applies to capital, i.e., the eﬃciency gaps are assumed to be Hicks-neutral. If ρ(i) > 1,
then the foreign economy has a technological disadvantage, and vice versa if ρ(i) < 1.
The cost-advantage from factor price diﬀerences is, of course, the core of the analysis, and
it is less straightforward, depending on how the factor intensity of production changes with
i. For simplicity, I assume that more “downstream” stages are always more capital intensive
than more “upstream” stages at all relevant factor price ratios. I.e., the capital intensity
of stages, fr(w,r,i)/fw(w,r,i), increases monotonically and continuously with i. What this
implies for the cost-advantage of outsourcing depends on how domestic factor prices w and r
deviate from foreign factor prices ¯ w and ¯ r. Assuming that foreign factor prices are unaﬀected





as the relative cost-advantage of outsourcing stemming from factor price diﬀerences. Given
the assumption on fr(w,r,i)/fw(w,r,i), this measure of foreign cost-advantage falls with i if
w/r > ¯ w/¯ r, and it increases with i if w/r < ¯ w/¯ r. I will deal with the case where w/r > ¯ w/¯ r,
whence γ(w,r,i) monotonically falls in i, meaning that there is an incentive to outsource early
(labour intensive) stages of production. It will become apparent below that the approach is
not restricted to this case in any fundamental way, but can be applied — mutatis mutandis —
to other cases as well.5 Assuming w/r > ¯ w/¯ r at the outset when domestic factor prices are
endogenous may seem questionable. From a theoretical point of view, as long as we restrict
ourselves to local comparative statics, this simply amounts to an unspeciﬁed assumption
3In many crucial aspects of this paper, artiﬁcial barriers — tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ — act pretty much like these
iceberg-costs, but consistent modeling would imply further complications in that tariﬀ revenue or quota rents
need to be modeled explicitly.
4This implies that the foreign economy can accommodate any additional factor demand that may arise from
international fragmentation by means of Rybzcynski-type internal reallocation at constant factor prices. The
attendant output eﬀects are, in turn, accommodated by world commodity markets at unchanged ﬁnal output
prices. In this sense, the assumption of constant foreign factor prices can be interpreted as the domestic and
the foreign country being two small economies. An equivalent interpretation is to treat the foreign economy
as the rest of the world where any factor demand that may arise from domestic outsourcing is of a negligible
magnitude.
5There is, of course, the possibility of factor intensity reversals. In the present setup, this would mean that
the monotonicity of the capital intensity with respect to i itself depends on factor prices. The implication of
assuming monotonicity of γ(w,r,i) in i is that factor intensity reversals are not ruled out in principle, but
they do not occur in the relevant range of wage-rental ratios [w/r, ¯ w/¯ r].
4about the two countries’ relative factor endowments. From an empirical point of view, such
an assumption will often be quite reasonable, but it is clear that for some scenarios one might
want to look at the twin assumptions of constant foreign foreign factor prices and w/r > ¯ w/¯ r
may not be reasonable.
Combining factor price considerations with the technology of fragmentation and Ricardian
productivity gaps, we now assume that the overall cost-advantage
Γ(w,r,i) ≡ γ(w,r,i)/[τ(i)ρ(i)] (2)
preserves the monotonicity of γ(w,r,i).As u ﬃcient condition for this is that [τ(i)ρ(i)] is non-
decreasing in i. Figure 1 depicts logγ(w,r,i) as a function of i, and then derives logΓ(w,r,i)
by combining it with logτ(i) and logρ(i), assuming linearity for easier drawing. Figure
2 depicts domestic factor price contours satisfying Γ(w,r,i)=1for alternative levels of
i ∈ [0,1], including the two extreme cases where i =0 ,a n dw h e r ei =1 . Several points are
worth pointing out about this set of contours.
1. Points above the contour for any i = i0 indicate domestic factor prices where domestic
production of stage i0 (and a fortiori of stages i<i 0) is not competitive, relative to
outsourcing. The opposite holds true for points below such a contour. Points above
the contour for i0 are thus consistent with equilibrium only if some stages higher than
i0 are located abroad, and vice versa for points below.
2. For an arbitrary domestic factor price ratio (w/r)
0 > ¯ w/¯ r, the slopes of these contours
are equal in absolute value to the capital intensity of stage i, fr(w,r,i)/fw(w,r,i).T h e
slope is larger for higher i (more “downstream” stages).
3. Since Γ(w,r,i) is monotonically increasing in i, contours for higher i lie farther “north-
east”.
4. The radial distance between the two extreme contours along a ray (w/r)
0 is determined
by the gap between (w/r)
0 and ¯ w/¯ r, and by the extent to which the capital intensity
increases as production moves further “downstream”.
5. For wage-rental ratios equal to ¯ w/¯ r the contours for all i ∈ [0,1] have equal slopes, their
distance from the origin diﬀering only due to τ(i)ρ(i).
6. The whole set of contours is deﬁned independently of the price of the ﬁnal good p1.
This will be a crucial for the analysis to follow.
For future reference, we call the case depicted in ﬁgures 1 and 2 case I-a. The analysis will
largely stick to this case, but it is worth considering alternative assumptions, in order to see
that it is actually quite general. Suppose the capital intensity falls as we move “downstream”
5the value-added process and labour is relatively cheap in the domestic economy, w/r <
¯ w/¯ r.W e m a y l a b e l t h i s case II-a where γ(w,r,i) is monotonically increasing in i.I t i s
straightforward that this case is covered by a diagram like ﬁgure 2, with a reverse labeling
of axes. This assumes, of course, that monotonicity of γ(w,r,i) is preserved by Γ(w,r,i).
International fragmentation again implies outsourcing of early stages, but these are now more
capital intensive than later stages. The case where the capital intensity increases with i and
where w/r < ¯ w/¯ r implies that γ(w,r,i) is monotonically falling in i, as in case I-a. For
obvious reasons, we label this case I-b.A s i n ﬁgure 2, on any ray through the origin the
slope of contours for Γ(w,r,i)=1rises with i, but unlike ﬁgure 2 contours for higher i are
now closer to the origin, since the domestic economy has relatively cheap labour. Therefore,
domestic advantage lies with early stages of production, and international fragmentation
starts with outsourcing the most “downstream” stages. The remaining case II-b emerges if
the capital intensity falls with i, and if domestic labour is relatively expensive (as in the
benchmark case I-a). In this case γ(w,r,i) is monotonically rising in i, and it is clear that it
is formally equivalent to case I-b with reversed axes, again assuming that the monotonicity of
γ(w,r,i) is preserved by Γ(w,r,i). This discussion reveals that the approach pursued below
can easily be applied — mutatis mutandis — to cases where the factor intensity ordering is
diﬀerent.
The set of Γ-contours is a convenient device to characterize the “technology” of interna-
tional fragmentation.6 To proceed towards an “endogenous fragmentation factor price fron-
tier” we must look at overall minimum unit cost involving all stages of production. We use i∗
to denote the cost minimizing margin of international fragmentation, separating the stages
produced at home from those outsourced to foreign factor markets.7 Then, the minimum








6The term “technology” may seem somewhat unusual here, since it incorporates foreign factor prices, while
technology is usually viewed as a more fundamental concept not related to prices. But exchanging domestic
productioon for imports is, in essence, an alternative technology to obtain the imported goods, the technology
being described by the terms of trade. In this sense, foreign factor prices constitute the terms of trade for
outsourcing.
7See Kohler (2003) for a related deﬁnition of the margin of international fragmentation with discrete stages.
6where i∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition8
Γ(w,r,i∗)=1 if 0 <i ∗ < 1, (4a)
Γ(w,r,i∗) ≤ 1 if i∗ =0 , (4b)
and Γ(w,r,i∗) ≥ 1 if i∗ =1 . (4c)
The second order condition on the margin i∗ is satisﬁed from the monotonicity assumption
relating to 2. To simplify notation, we shall henceforth use ¯ v1(¯ w,¯ r,i∗) and v1(w,r,i∗) to
denote the factor cost of foreign and domestic value-added, respectively, per unit of the ﬁnal
good:
¯ v1(¯ w,¯ r,i∗) ≡
R i∗
0 a(i)τ(i)ρ(i)f(¯ w,¯ r,i)di and v1(w,r,i∗) ≡
R 1
i∗ a(i)f(w,r,i)di, (5)
where i∗ is again determined by 4 above.
3 A generalized factor price frontier
The multistage technology of production, together with the technology of international frag-
mentation determine the set of factor prices that are consistent with a zero proﬁt equilibrium,
given a certain ﬁnal output price. This set can be described by means of a factor price fron-
tier. I use p1 do denote the price of good 1, expressed in units of the numéraire good 2,
and given exogenously at ¯ p1 from world markets, taking the domestic economy to be small.
Assuming perfect competition and free entry, a production equilibrium in sector 1 requires
zero proﬁts, i.e.,
c1(w,r,i∗)=¯ p1, (6)
where c1(w,r,i∗) is taken from 3. Notice that the cost minimizing margin of fragmentation
i∗ varies endogenously with factor prices — in li n ew i t h4—a sw em o v ea l o n gt h i sf r o n t i e r .
Moreover, it also depends on the ﬁnal goods price, i.e., we have i∗ = i∗(w,r, ¯ p1).W es h a l ls e e
below how i∗ responds to changes in the ﬁnal goods price. Equations 6 and 4 together are
ar e p r e s e n t a t i o no ft h edomestic endogenous fragmentation factor price frontier (henceforth
labeled ef-fpf) for the multistage industry 1.
To see more clearly how the ef-fpf diﬀers from the conventional zero proﬁt line, it is useful
to look at the factor price contour c1(w,r,i0)=¯ p1 for some arbitrary margin of fragmentation
i = i0, ignoring for a moment the optimality condition 4. In view of 3 and 5, the conventional
fpf satisﬁes
v1(w,r,i0)=¯ p1 − ¯ v1(¯ w,¯ r,i0). (7)
8See also Dixit & Grossman (1982) where the issue is comparative advantage and trade as such, rather
than international fragmentation.
7T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f7m a yb ec a l l e dt h eeﬀective price of the domestic value-added chain
per unit of the ﬁnal good, given the ﬁnal output price and the cost of outsourcing stages
up to i0.9 The position of the v1(w,r,i0)-contour in factor-price-space depends on ¯ p1 as well
as i0. For a constant ﬁnal output price there is, thus, a whole set of v1(w,r,i)-contours for
alternative levels of outsourcing i. All of these are downward sloping and convex, and the
familiar envelope property implies that at any point the slope reﬂects the aggregate capital
intensity of all domestic stages (i>i 0) of sector-1 production. Diﬀerentiating 7, and observing













Confronting the v1(w,r,i0)-contour with the set of contours Γ(w,r,i) which describes the
technology of international fragmentation, it becomes clear that if 0 <i 0 < 1 there is only
one point of the v1(w,r,i0)-contour which also belongs to the “endogenous fragmentation
factor price frontier”. This point is where the v1(w,r,i0)- l i n e—t h ed a s h e dl i n ei nﬁgure 2 —
and the line for Γ(w,r,i0)=1intersect. Since by assumption all “interior” domestic stages
of production are more capital intensive than the marginal stage i0, at that intersection —
point b in ﬁg u r e2—t h eΓ(w,r,i0)-line is ﬂatter than the v1(w,r,i0)-contour. All points on
the v1(w,r,i0)-contour to the left of the intersection point, with a wage-rental ratio higher
than (w/r)0, are not part of the ef-fpf, since they violate the optimality condition 4 on the
equilibrium margin of fragmentation. Moving to the left on the v1(w,r,i0)-contour leads to
points above the line for Γ(w,r,i0)=1 ,w h e r eΓ(w,r,i0) > 1 implies that domestic production
of stage i0 is ineﬃcient. Firms would forego the possibility of reducing unit-costs for the ﬁnal
output by outsourcing further stages of production to the foreign economy. Similar reasoning
applies to points on the v1(w,r,i0)-contour to the right of point b, where a cost reduction can
be achieved by reducing the margin of fragmentation below i0.
The ef-fpf is determined by equations 6 and 4. Using the implicit solution for the equilib-
rium margin of fragmentation i∗(w,r, ¯ p1), the formal expression for the ef-fpf may be written
as
c1[w,r,i∗(w,r, ¯ p1)] = ¯ p1, (9)
as opposed to c1(w,r,i0)=¯ p1 (equivalent to 7) for the traditional frontier which takes i = i0
as exogenously given. The argument above implies that for i0 = i∗ the contour deﬁn e db y7
(treating i ﬁxed at i0) is tangent from below to the ef-fpf as deﬁned in 9. This is a reﬂection of
the envelope property with respect to the equilibrium margin of fragmentation i∗.F o r m a l l y ,
9See Kohler (2003) for a more detailed elaboration on the relationship between the concept of eﬀective
prices, as used in the theory of eﬀective protection, and international fragmentation.







+a(i∗)τ(i∗)ρ(i∗)f(¯ w,¯ r,i∗) − a(i∗)f(w,r,i∗)=0 .
For interior i∗,t h eﬁrst order condition 4a guarantees that the two terms in the second line
cancel, hence ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dw
dr








Comparing with 8 for i0 = i∗, we have the aforementioned tangency condition. Moreover,
given our assumptions, the ef-fpf is convex and continuous.
As i∗ adjusts in line with 4, the ef-fpf crosses successive Γ-contours, until i∗ reaches its
upper or lower limit at i∗ =1or i∗ =0 , respectively. For i∗ =1 , with a wage rental ratio
equal to (w/r)1, the ef-fpf smoothly pastes with the Γ(w,r,1)- l i n ea tp o i n tc ,w h i l ef o ri∗ =0
it pastes with the traditional fpf for c1(w,r,0) = ¯ p1 (full domestic production of all stages)
at point a, with a wage rental ratio equal to (w/r)0. It is important to realize that, unlike
the set of Γ-contours, these limiting wage-rental ratios depend on the ﬁnal goods price; see
below. As the wage-rental ratio moves from (w/r)0 to (w/r)1,t h elogΓ(w,r,i)-line in ﬁgure
1 shifts to the right with successively higher intersection points with the horizontal zero-line.
It is worth pointing out once more that the whole set of Γ-contours changes as the foreign
wage-rental ratio changes. The position of these contours is governed by the condition that
along the ray ¯ w/¯ r the Γ-contours have the same slope for all i ∈ [0,1], with their distance to
the origin determined by τ(i)ρ(i).
Perhaps the most crucial point to be emphasized is that the ef-fpf, while featuring the same
slope as the conventional fpf (interpreted as the average capital intensity of domestic stages),
features a higher elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Any increase in the
wage-rental ratio, in addition to causing a substitution of capital for labour for all domestic
stages of production, also causes an endogenous adjustment of the margin of fragmentation
whereby the least labour intensive stages are relocated abroad, which reinforces the traditional
substitution eﬀect. In other words, endogenous international fragmentation makes capital and
labour closer substitutes than would be the case for a constant level of outsourcing. It has
often been conjectured that globalization has increased the elasticity of labour demand. That
elasticity is equal to the capital share times the elasticity of substitution, hence this result
suggests a rigorous theoretical rationale for the conjecture, expressed for instance in Fabbri,
Haskel & Slaughter (2002). One must, however, be cautious in drawing conclusions. The
ef-fpf is a partial equilibrium device in that it looks only at the multistage sector 1. Taking
into account general equilibrium interrelationships, the overall elasticity of labour demand
depends on possibilities of factor reallocation between the multistage sector and other sectors
of the economy; see below. But the result points to the general importance of accounting
9for fragmentation when empirically estimating (or using) elasticities of labour demand in
the context of globalization. We may summarize this section by means of the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 For given foreign factor prices and a given ﬁnal output price, the set of factor
prices supported by a c.r.s. technology featuring a continuum of stages with varying capital
intensities and cost-minimizing international fragmentation can be described by an “endoge-
nous fragmentation factor price frontier” (ef-fpf) which has the following properties: a) It
is continuous and convex, b) its slope measures the average capital intensity of the domes-
tic stages of production, but diﬀers from the capital intensity at the margin of international
fragmentation, and c) endogenous fragmentation makes capital and labour closer substitutes
in the multistage industry than appears from the conventional fpf which takes the margin of
fragmentation as exogenously given.
4 General equilibrium
It is obvious that the ef-fpf alone is not enough to determine factor prices, or changes in these
prices brought about, for instance, by certain scenarios of globalization. This can only be
achieved by means of a general equilibrium analysis which also highlights conditions of factor
reallocation between sectors. This section therefore extends the analysis by adding a single
stage (numéraire) sector.10 I present the general equilibrium conditions for a small economy
and then turn to comparative statics, largely relying on diagrammatic analysis using the
ef-fpf for sector 1 derived above.
In addition to the zero proﬁt conditions for sector 1, given by equations 6 and 4, general
equilibrium requires zero proﬁts in sector 2, as well as full employment of labour and capital,
which are assumed to be in given supply L0 and K0, respectively. Using c2(w,r) to denote
the minimum unit-cost function for sector 2, zero proﬁts imply
c2(w,r)=1 . (11)
Full employment requires
v1w(w,r,i∗)q1 + c2w(w,r)q2 = L0 (12a)
and v1r(w,r,i∗)q1 + c2r(w,r)q2 = K0, (12b)
where qj denotes ﬁnal output in sector j. Equations 12 make use of Shephard’s Lemma,
whereby subscripts w and r denote partial derivatives, whence v1w(w,r,i∗) indicates labour
10In the sequel sector 2 will be alternatively referred to as the numéraire sector and the single-stage sector.
10demand per unit of ﬁnal good 1, based on deﬁnitions 5. Analogous interpretations hold
for v1r(w,r,i∗),a sw e l la sf o rc2w(w,r) and c2r(w,r). Note that domestic factor demands
in sector 1 also depend on the margin of international fragmentation i∗ w h i c hi si nt u r na
function of w and r, as well as p1, determined by equations 6 and 4, i.e., i∗ = i∗(w,r, ¯ p1).
Equations 4, 6, 11 and 12 form a simultaneous system of 5 equations determining equilib-
rium values for 5 endogenous variables: w,r,i∗,q 1 and q2.B o t hc2(w,r) and v1(w,r,i∗) are
homogeneous of degree 1 in w and r. Hence the zero proﬁt and full employment conditions
imply the usual equality between the value of output and aggregate income:
¯ p1q1 + q2 = wL0 + rK0 +¯ v1(¯ w,¯ r,i∗)q1 (13a)
or, equivalently, ¯ π1(¯ p1, ¯ w,¯ r,i∗)q1 + q2 = wL0 + rK0, (13b)
where ¯ π1(¯ p1, ¯ w,¯ r,i∗)=¯ p1 −¯ v1(¯ w,¯ r,i∗) is the eﬀective price of domestic sector-1 value-added
per unit of the ﬁnal good. Introducing Marshallian demand functions d1(wL0 +rK0, ¯ p1) and
d2(wL0 + rK0, ¯ p1)=wL0 + rK0 − d1(wL0 + rK0, ¯ p1),w eh a v et h et r a d eb a l a n c ee q u a t i o n
d2 − q2 +¯ v1(¯ w,¯ r,i∗)q1 =¯ p1(q1 − d1), (14)
stating that imports of good 2 plus the value of outsourcing in sector 1 are equal to the
value of ﬁnal good 1 exports. Note that equations 13 and 14 are no independent equilibrium
conditions, but implied by the aforementioned set of ﬁve equilibrium conditions.


















where κj and λj are the allocation shares of capital and labour, respectively, employed in
industry j. Naturally, we have κ1 + κ2 =1and λ1 + λ2 =1 . I.e., in equilibrium, the given
overall capital-labour endowment ratio must be equal to a weighted average of the sectoral
capital intensities, with weights equal to the respective labour allocation shares (equation
15b). Analogously for the labour-capital endowment ratio and the capital allocation shares
(equation 15a). An implication of this familiar property to which we turn below is that
whenever the capital intensities of both activities rises, full employment requires an expansion
— in terms of an increase in qi — of the less capital intensive activity, and vice versa.
Figure 3 depicts general equilibrium for some initial price ¯ p0
1 by combining the correspond-
ing factor price frontier ef-fpf0
1 with a frontier representing 11, labeled fpf2. With good 2 being
our numéraire, the position of fpf2 is independent of goods prices; the superscripts A,B and
C will be explained shortly. Assuming that both sectors are viable domestically, equilib-
rium factor prices w∗0 and r∗0 are found at the intersection point E0, which also determines
11the equilibrium margin of international fragmentation i∗0. We assume that the intersection
point lies on the segment ac of the multistage factor price frontier, whence 0 <i ∗0 < 1.
The aggregate capital intensity of all domestic stages of industry 1 is equal to the slope of
ef-fpf0
1, which exceeds the marginal capital intensity at stage i∗0, equal to the slope of the
line Γ(w,r,i∗0)=1 .I nt h es e q u e l ,kv
1 and km
1 denote the equilibrium aggregate and marginal
capital intensities, respectively, of domestic stages of production, while k2 denotes the equi-
librium capital intensity of sector 2. Since we are looking at case I-a (see above), we have
kv
1 >k m
1 . Depending on the technology in sector 2, we can now envisage three alternative
types of equilibria.
Case A: The factor price frontier for sector 2 (labeled fpfA
2 ) is steeper at the intersection
point than the v1(w,r,i∗0)-line, i.e., the numéraire sector 2 is more capital intensive
than domestic value-added in sector 1. By necessity, its capital intensity is then also
higher than the marginal capital intensity of sector 1: k2 >k v
1 >k m
1 .
Case B: The factor price frontier for sector 2 (labeled fpfB
2 ) is ﬂatter than the Γ1(w,r,i∗0)-
line. The capital intensity of sector 2 is lower than the marginal capital intensity of
sector 1. By necessity, sector 2 is also also less capital intensive than domestic sector 1
value-added: k2 <k m
1 <k v
1.
Case C: The factor price frontier for sector 2 (labeled fpfC
2 ) is ﬂatter than the v1(w,r,i∗0)-
line, but steeper than the Γ1(w,r,i∗0)-line. I.e., the capital intensity of sector 2 is larger
than sector 1’s marginal capital intensity, but lower than observed capital intensity of
value-added in sector 1: km
1 <k 2 <k v
1.
Before turning to comparative statics, we may note two interesting general equilibrium
implications of endogenous fragmentation. As compared to a case where the margin of frag-
mentation is considered constant, endogenous fragmentation, by making capital and labour
closer substitutes in the multistage process, also increases the elasticity of substitution along
the economy’s production possibilities frontier. The other is that it also increases the “like-
lihood” of factor intensity reversals between sectors.11
5 Protection under endogenous fragmentation
Turning to comparative statics under endogenous fragmentation, we ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ee ﬀect of
a rise in the domestic ﬁnal goods price of the multistage sector on domestic factor prices, on
the margin of fragmentation, and on outputs. As far as these eﬀects are concerned, we may
11As opposed to reversals between stages within sector 1, which was dealt with above.
12also interpret this as a trade policy scenario: an import tariﬀ if good 1 is imported, or an
export subsidy if it is exported.12 I shall rely on the diagrammatic representation, focusing
on the three diﬀerent cases identiﬁed in ﬁgure 3, assuming a small change from an interior
equilibrium where 0 <i ∗0 < 1.
5.1 Factor rewards and real income distribution
Suppose the relative change is ˆ p1 > 0.Aﬁrst point to note is that the whole set of contours
for Γ(w,r,i)=1remains unaﬀected by such a change. To see how the ef-fpf1 contour shifts,
it is again convenient to ﬁrst look at the traditional factor price frontier for a ﬁxed i = i∗0,
g i v e nb y7a b o v e .D i ﬀerentiating 7, it is easily seen that this frontier shifts out proportionally
by a factor equal to (1+ ˆ p1/θ0
1v),w h e r eθ0
1v ≡ v1(w∗0,r∗0,i ∗0)
±
c1(w∗0,r∗0,i ∗0) is the share of
domestic to overall value-added in sector 1 at the initial margin of international fragmentation.
In other words, the eﬀective price of domestic value added increases by 100×ˆ p1/θ0
1v percent.
Al o wθ0
1v thus acts as a leverage on the eﬀective price increase.
In line with the theory of eﬀective protection, a higher eﬀective price mandates higher
domestic factor prices. If we write π0
1 for the initial eﬀective price, then the new position of
the initial v1(w,r,i∗0)-contour is now determined by v1(w,r,i∗0)=¯ π0
1(1 + ˆ p1/θ0
1v).D u e t o
homothetic technology, the slope of this line is the same as the initial line for v1(w,r,i∗0)=¯ π0
1
at a common wage-rental ratio w∗0/r∗0. To avoid clutter, these v1(w,r,i∗0)-contours have not
been drawn in ﬁgure 3. While passing on the eﬀective price increase proportionally to both
factors would satisfy 6, it would violate 4a. The reason is that this moves the economy above
the Γ(w,r,i∗0)-line, which remains unchanged by ˆ p1. Hence, a point where both factor prices
increase by a factor (1 + ˆ p1/θ0
1v), while belonging to the traditional fpf with an exogenous
margin of fragmentation, does not belong to the new ef-fpf1. Formally, such a point is fully
comparable to a point on the v(w,r,i0)-line in ﬁgure 1 to the left of point b. Applying the logic
pertaining to that ﬁgure, we conclude that, for a wage-rental ratio equal to w∗0/r∗0, the new
ef-fpf1 passes through a point above the line v1(w,r,i∗0)=¯ π0
1(1 + ˆ p1/θ0
1v), and it is steeper
there than at the initial equilibrium. Intuitively, as domestic factor owners proportionally
reap the beneﬁto fah i g h e re ﬀective price, ﬁrms lose competitiveness at the initial margin i∗0.
At an unchanged wage-rental ratio, the new ef-fpf1 therefore features an equilibrium margin
of fragmentation higher than i∗0. As a result, domestic value-added in sector 1 becomes a
more capital intensive process, and the cost-savings eﬀect of further outsourcing mandates
factor price increases beyond a factor equal to (1 + ˆ p1/θ0
1v).
If we apply the above reasoning to the three cases considered in the previous section, we
12The welfare eﬀect is, of course, diﬀerent for an exogenous world price change and a policy induced change
in the domestic price, at a given world price.
13arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If there is a multistage industry where the capital intensity of value-added
stages is monotonically higher for more “downstream” stages, if there is a viable numéraire
sector which is not amenable to international fragmentation, if factors are completely mobile
between sectors, and if the domestic economy has relatively expensive domestic labour, then
an increase in the given world market price for the ﬁnal good of this industry aﬀects the
equilibrium margin of international fragmentation i∗, the domestic wage rate w, and domestic
capital rental r as follows:
Case A: If the numéraire sector is more capital intensive than aggregate domestic value-added
in the multistage sector, then i∗ rises (more outsourcing), while r falls and w is increased.
Case B: If the capital intensity of the numéraire sector is lower than the marginal capital
intensity of the multistage sector, then i∗ increases, with a higher r and a lower w.
Case C: If the numéraire sector exhibits a capital intensity lower than the aggregate of all
domestic stages, but higher than that of the marginal stage, then the result is a lower i∗ (less
outsourcing), while w falls and r rises.
In discussing this result, several things are worth pointing out. First, outsourcing may
be a “friend” or an “enemy” to domestic labour. The crucial point is not only whether the
numéraire sector is less capital intensive than domestic value-added (in which case a rise
in ¯ p1 always works against labour), but also whether its capital intensity is lower than the
marginal capital intensity of domestic value-added in the multistage industry. If this latter
condition is violated, then a rise in ¯ p1, while still hurting labour, lowers outsourcing. In this
sense it can then be said that outsourcing and labour are “friends”. Secondly, a rise in ¯ p1
will never be a Pareto improvement. This is ruled out by the presence of a viable single-stage
sector which is not amenable to international fragmentation. This result is a reﬂection of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which in this sense is upheld under endogenous fragmentation.
A further point worth mentioning is that in Case A of the proposition the ﬁnal goods price
change drives international factor prices further apart.13
An interesting question to ask is whether endogenous fragmentation reinforces or miti-
gates the Jonesian magniﬁcation eﬀects underlying the Stolper-Samuelson theorem [see Jones
(1965)]. We assume that the economy is diversiﬁed with 0 <i ∗ < 1 in both the initial and
the new equilibrium reached after the ﬁnal goods price change. For a notionally unchanged
margin of fragmentation, the eﬀective price for domestic value added changes by a larger
13This possibility has been pointed out by Deardorﬀ (2001b). Here, it is a corollary of a general proposition
relating to a change in the ﬁnal goods price.
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A ﬁrst point to note is that — in all cases considered — the economy moves along a
downward sloping fpf2-line, hence some factor always suﬀers a real income loss if ˆ p1 > 0,a s
mentioned above. Moreover, some factor will necessarily gain in real terms if ˆ p1 < 0.T h e
cost-savings eﬀect from an endogenous adjustment of outsourcing cannot, therefore, avoid
the magniﬁcation eﬀects as such. To see if it reinforces or mitigates these eﬀects, we may use
the dual logic introduced by Mussa (1979). Again, we ﬁrst look at the v1(w,r,i∗0)-schedule
and how it shifts upon ˆ p1, identifying the traditional magniﬁcation eﬀect under a constant
i = i∗0. In our model, however, such a situation will involve a fragmentation disequilibrium,
and if we can identify how the endogenous margin of fragmentation changes, then we should
also be able to see if the magniﬁcation eﬀect is strengthened, or mitigated.
We have seen above that ˆ p1 > 0 causes the eﬀective price of domestic value added to
increase by a factor of (1 + ˆ p1/θ0
1v).T h ef p f 1-line for an unchanged margin of fragmentation
i = i∗0 thus shifts out proportionally to a position deﬁned by v1(w,r,i∗0)=π0
1(1+ ˆ p1/θ0
1v).14
To avoid clutter, no fpf1-line has been drawn in ﬁgure 1, but it is easy to imagine its initial
position as being tangent from below to the ef-fpf0
1-line at E0.I ft h ef p f 1-line shifts out, its
intersection point with the fpf2 line determines the new factor prices, featuring a magniﬁcation
eﬀect in all possible cases considered. For instance, in case A the new equilibrium point will
be found at an intersection point with fpfA
2 -line where r∗1 is lower than r∗0 and w∗1 >
w∗0(1 + ˆ p1/θ0
1v). Similar logic applies to cases B and C.15 The fragmentation disequilibrium
is now easily identiﬁed by recognizing that none of these intersection points lies on the
Γ(w,r,i∗0)-contour. Cases A and B lead to a point above that contour, while case C leads
to a point below. In this latter case, the domestic wage rate has fallen by so much that
foreign production of stage i∗0 has become ineﬃcient, and ﬁrms in sector 1 will shift the
margin of fragmentation below i∗0, thereby further reducing unit cost of ﬁnal output and
allowing domestic factor prices to rise beyond the frontier v1(w,r,i∗0)=π0
1(1 + ˆ p1/θ0
1v).
Allowing for endogenous adjustment of fragmentation, we thus arrive at an intersection point
between the ef-fpf1
1-line and the fpfC
1 -line which involves a further reduction of w and a
further increase in r.T h em a g n i ﬁcation eﬀect is thus reinforced. It is relatively easy to see
that the same logic leads to a reinforcement of the magniﬁcation eﬀect also in cases A and B
where the fragmentation disequilibrium associated with the conventional magniﬁcation eﬀect
implies that i∗ rises above i∗0, meaning that reinforcement happens via further outsourcing.
Moreover, it is relatively easy to verify by the same logic that the magniﬁcation eﬀects will
14We assume small changes in which case we may argue with local approximations.
15This dual logic to identify the Stolper-Samuelson theorem has been introduced by Mussa (1979).
15be mitigated for a fall in the ﬁnal goods price, ˆ p1 < 0. W em a yt h u ss t a t et h ef o l l o w i n g
proposition.
Proposition 3 If there is a single stage sector alongside a multistage industry, then the real
income eﬀects from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem are upheld under endogenous fragmenta-
tion, irrespective of the cost-savings eﬀect from outsourcing. Compared with the conventional
case without fragmentation, or a case where the margin of fragmentation is exogenous and
constant, an endogenous adjustment of the margin of fragmentation strengthens the magni-
ﬁcation eﬀects underlying this theorem for both factors, if the ﬁnal goods price rises. If the
ﬁnal goods price falls, then the attendant magniﬁcation eﬀect is mitigated for both factors.
Notice that the proposition makes no reference to whether endogenous adjustment of
fragmentation implies a higher or lower level of outsourcing. This a reﬂection of the above
mentioned ambiguity as regards the “enemy”-relationship of outsourcing to labour. On the
other hand, in case A labour ends up unambiguously worse oﬀ if any change in the ﬁnal goods
price, whether a rise or a fall, is accompanied by an endogenous adjustment of fragmentation,
than if the margin of fragmentation is assumed constant. The reverse is true for cases
B and C. Case B is quite relevant against the background of some of the concerns about
economic globalization. If a country hosts the relatively capital intensive stages of a multistage
process which is relatively capital intensive domestically, then the possibility of international
outsourcing to a low-wage country aggravates the adverse wage rate eﬀect (beneﬁcial eﬀect
on capital rental) which stems from an increase in ﬁnal output price of this industry. Notice,
however, that this may well entail not an increase, but a lowering of the level of international
outsourcing (Case B above).
5.2 Production and endowments
The presence of a second sector is also crucial for whether endowment changes have any eﬀect
on international fragmentation. It is relatively easy to see that such an eﬀect necessarily arises
if the multistage sector is the only domestic activity. In this case, equilibrium requires that
the domestic endowment ratio K0/L0 be tangent to the ef-fpf1-line. Then, any change in the
domestic capital-labour endowment ratio would move the economy along the ef-fpf1line to a
diﬀerent Γ-contour, representing a lower (higher) level of outsourcing if the economy becomes
more (less) labour abundant. Conversely, if the economy is diversiﬁed, then a small change
i nt h ee n d o w m e n tr a t i ow i l ln o ta ﬀect outsourcing. This is a notable diﬀerence to the case
considered by Feenstra & Hanson (1996, 1997), where the multistage sector is the only activity
in the economy and where international capital movement causes further outsourcing. In a
multisector economy, provided the economy remains in the cone of diversiﬁcation, outsourcing
is driven only by prices and is insensitive towards endowment changes.
16In line with the theory of eﬀective protection, one is inclined to interpret any increase
in the ﬁnal goods price at unchanged prices of imported intermediate inputs as having a
protective eﬀect on that sector. This is unambiguously true in the present model if we
measure the protective eﬀect in terms of sectoral outputs qi. This follows from the above
mentioned general equilibrium property that a rise in the capital intensity of both sectors
requires a reallocation of both factors towards the less capital intensive activity, and vice
versa. However, introducing as an alternative measure of the protective eﬀect the stages of
value added produced domestically, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Only in case C where the capital intensi t yo ft h en u m é r a i r es e c t o rl i e si n
between the marginal and average capital intensity, respectively, of domestic value added in
the multistage sector does an increase in the ﬁnal output price of the multistage product (or
an increase in the eﬀective price) protect domestic value added in terms of both, the overall
output and the number of stages produced. In cases A and B an increase in p1,w h i l ec a u s i n g
a reallocation of both factors into the multistage industry, disprotects the marginal stage of
domestic value added, whence expansion of the industry is paralleled by outsourcing further
stages to the foreign economy.
The explanation of the disprotective eﬀect in cases A and B is that any attempt to
reap the beneﬁts of a higher eﬀective price through higher domestic factor rewards makes
the domestic economy uncompetitive at the marginal stage. Referring to ﬁgure 3, the re-
sulting movements along fpfA
2 or fpfB
2 , attendant upon the outward shift of the ef-fpf1-line
to lead the economy to the northeast of the Γ(w,r,i∗0)-line.16 It is interesting to envisage
consecutive price increases for the multistage product. In case A the process of adjustment
is characterized by a reallocation of capital and labour towards sector 1, but with an ever
narrower specialization in downstream stages of the production process until the economy
becomes completely specialized in the multistage industry, but producing only a narrow range
of stages at the downstream end. Figure 3 indicates such a situation at point d, where the
endowment ratio coincides with the slope of the new ef-fpf1
1-line. A similar scenario arises for
case B. Which of the two is relevant depends on the endowment ratio of the economy, scenario
B arising for a more labour abundant country.17 In case C, on the other hand, increasing
16It is worth pointing out that such a disprotecitve eﬀect on marginal stages is absent in Dixit and Gross-
man (1982) who employ a speciﬁc-factors model. They note a diﬀerent counter-intuitive possibility: Gaining
additional stages of the production process may make the multistage activity less intensive in the mobile factor
to such an extent that the output increase due to protection does not suﬃce to absorb the entire labor set
free in the unprotected sector. The result is an unambiguous real income loss to labor, which is not possible
in the simpler speciﬁc-factors model.





17specialization in the multistage industry takes the form of an ever broader range of stages
produced domestically.
6 Improved “technology” of international fragmentation
In the present model, all aspects of the “technology” of international fragmentation are
conveniently summarized in dual form by the set of contours Γ(w,r,i)=1which are also de-
termined by foreign factor prices ¯ w and ¯ r, as emphasized above. In all of the above scenarios,
the whole set of Γ-contours was assumed to remain constant. In other words, any outsourcing
eﬀect considered took place under a given technology of international fragmentation.
Much of the concern about economic globalization, however, evolves around technological
changes which directly bear on outsourcing and international fragmentation.18 Our set of
Γ-contours should be a convenient tool to explore such changes. In this paper, I shall restrict
myself to simple changes in the “iceberg”-cost of fragmentation captured by the function
τ(i), but it is obvious that the approach can be applied to changes in foreign factor prices, as
well as extended to more complex aspects of the fragmentation technology. This is, however,
beyond the scope of the present paper.
Suppose that τ(i) can be decomposed into a general term applicable to all stages of
production, and a stages-speciﬁc term: τ(i)=τ0ζ(i). I shall look at the simplest case where
the technological improvement only aﬀects the general term. I.e., for all i ∈ [0,1], we have
dτ(i)= dτ0ζ(i) < 0. Given homotheticity of γ(w,r,i), it is obvious that this leads to a
proportional inward shift of each Γ(w,r,i)-contour in factor price space. An alternative way
to capture this change is to say that the initial contours for now represent a diﬀerent margin





where in line with our assumptions γ(w,r,i) is falling in i, i.e., γi < 0;s e ea b o v e .
The immediate eﬀect is that the initial equilibrium E0 in ﬁgure 3 is now a fragmentation










2 . By necessity, therefore, case B features a more labor abundant
domestic economy than case A.
18See, for instance Jones & Kierzkowski (1990), as well as Harris (1995, 2001) and Jones and Kierzkowski
(2001a), where it is argued that technological advances in transport and communication make fragmentation
less costly.
18where di is taken from 16. Given that di in 16 is negative, this is an alternative way of
saying that E0 lies above the new Γ-contour for i∗0. Unit-costs may be lowered by extending
the margin of fragmentation beyond i∗0. But there is an additional eﬀect stemming from
infra-marginal stages i<i ∗0. These are now obtained cheaper than before, the cost-eﬀect
being
R i∗0
i=0 ζ(i)ρ(i)f(¯ w,¯ r,i)dτ0 di<0.
This acts just like an increase in the eﬀective price, and the implication of this is as considered
above. There is an inward shift in the conventional (constant margin i∗0) factor price frontier
determined by 7 for i0 = i∗0. It becomes clear that the direct eﬀect on the Γ-contours and
this latter eﬀect on the v1(w,r,i∗0)-contour reinforce each other towards an increase in the
margin of fragmentation. Indeed, applying the logic used above to determine the eﬀects of
an increase in the ﬁnal goods price, we realize that an improvement in the technology of
fragmentation similarly shifts the ef-fpf1-line outward, while at the same time rotating it in
a clockwise fashion. However, the pattern of eﬀe c t si sn o tq u i t et h es a m e ,a ss u m m a r i z e di n
the following proposition.
Proposition 5 An equal reduction of the costs of international fragmentation accross all
stages unambiguously raises the equilibrium margin of international fragmentation i∗.I t
leads to a lower real wage rate and a higher real capital rental if factor intensities are as in
cases B and , while opposite factor price eﬀects arise in case A.
The crucial diﬀerence to the protection scenario considered above is that i∗ always in-
creases. The reason is that, in addition to the rotated shift in the ef-fpf1-line, we now also
observe a change in the set of Γ-contours. A number of points are worth mentioning. First, a
Pareto improvement is ruled out, the crucial point being the presence of a viable single-stage
sector, as noted above. Absent such a non-fragmentation activity, a Pareto improvement is
possible, since the scenario features a savings in real resource use. Indeed, Feenstra & Han-
son (1996, p.101, and 1997, p.378) emphasize such a possibility for a scenario which looks
diﬀerent, but in a fundamental sense is quite similar to the one considered here.19 The crucial
point here is that their setup rules out any non-fragmentation activity. The impossibility of
a Pareto improvement is quite independent on the driving force behind the change in i∗.20
19In the Feenstra-Hansen case the two factor considered are high- and low-skilled labor, which are nested
in a production function with capital. In their scenario, an increase in i
∗ is brought about by international
capital movement from the country where low-skilled labor is relatively expensive to the other country where
it is relatively cheap — the foreign country in our setup. Obviously, this must increase productivity of both
types of labor in the foreign country, which in our setup acts exactly like a downward-shift in τ(i).
20See Kohler (2003) for a general statement.
19Secondly, in contrast to Feenstra & Hanson (1996 and 1997), the distributional change
attendant upon a shift in the margin of international fragmentation is ambiguous. Again,
it is the presence of a viable single-stage sector which makes the diﬀerence. Thus, suppose
the single-stage sector were non-viable. Then the rotated shift in the ef-fpf1-line caused by
dτ0 < 0 would unambiguously lower the domestic wage-rental ratio. This follows from the
fact that full employment now requires that the slope of the ef-fpf1- l i n em u s tb ee q u a lt ot h e
given domestic capital-labour endowment ratio.21
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I have studied international fragmentation of production using a framework
with a continuum of fragments. With a continuum of stages, outsourcing is a continuous
process. I have developed a generalized version of the familiar factor price frontier, where
the margin of international fragmentation endogenously adjusts along the frontier. I have
embedded this frontier in a simple general equilibrium model of a small economy hosting a
single-stage industry in addition to the multistage process that is subject to fragmentation.
I have shown that such a generalized frontier proves useful in two distinct ways. First, it
is a convenient dual representation of the “technology” of international fragmentation, which
can be used to analyze the factor price eﬀects of a variety of changes directly related to
outsourcing. As an example, I have considered a uniform change in the cost of international
fragmentation across all stages. Secondly, I have shown that it is a useful tool to address
changes not directly related to outsourcing, but where the possibility of international frag-
mentation may be an important integral part of endogenous adjustment. As an example for
this, I have looked at changes in the ﬁnal output price of a multistage industry which may
outsource a variable range of its stages to a low-wage foreign country.
In all of the scenarios considered, a key distinction arises between the aggregate capital
intensity of all domestic stages of value-added, and the capital intensity of the process at the
margin of international fragmentation. While the generalized factor price frontier reﬂects the
average capital intensity, it deviates in a systematic way from the marginal capital intensity.
An exogenous change in the ﬁnal goods price leads to a “rotated” shift of the generalized
frontier. Taking into account the factor price frontier for the single-stage sector, one can
identify cases where international outsourcing is a “friend” or an “enemy” to domestic labour.
The relevant conditions relate to the capital intensity of the single-stage sector, relative to the
average and marginal capital intensity, respectively, of the multistage industry. The presence
21Kohler (2003) presents a general result on the distributional consequences of international fragmentation
which encompasses as special cases the results obtained by Feenstra & Hanson (1996 and 1997), as well as
Arndt (1997 and 1999).
20of a viable single-stage sector alongside the multistage industry proves crucial for whether
or not a shift in the margin of fragmentation caused by an improvement in the technology
of fragmentation is a Pareto improvement. Moreover, the endogenous adjustment of the
margin of international fragmentation in certain cases reinforces the magniﬁcation eﬀects of
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, while mitigating them in others. A multistage sector will
always respond to the increase of its ﬁnal output price by an increase in domestic value
added, but this may be achieved by a specializing on an ever narrower range of stages, or by
increasing the range of stages produced domestically.
The generalized factor price frontier developed in this paper also sheds light on “man-
dated factor price regressions” which have become popular in the empirical literature on
wages and globalization. It has often been acknowledged that introducing an outsourcing
regressor-variable involves a simultaneity problem which is diﬃcult to resolve. While the
present paper has taken a short-cut in that the generalized factor price frontier is a reduced
form relationship, the steps undertaken in the analysis, particularly those relating to the
“technology” of international fragmentation, should prove helpful when attempting to solve
the simultaneity problem by specifying a full simultaneous equations system incorporating a
separate “outsourcing equation”.
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